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THE FEDERAL SPEEDY TRIAL ACT:
STAMPEDE INTO AMBUSH
ROBERT L. DOYEL*
INTRODUCTION

Almost ten years have passed since the adoption of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974.*1 Experience with the application of

the Act during those years has shown that the purposes for
which the Act was adopted have not been achieved. 2 The severe
time limitations of the Act,3 virtually unlimited pre-accusation
delay,4 and nondiscoverability of names and addresses of witnesses 5 combine to give an unfair advantage to the prosecutor.
PURPOSES OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

1974

Enhancement of the accused's sixth amendment 6 right to a
speedy trial was only an incidental motive behind the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act. 7 The preamble to the Act does not
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Court Education Program,
The University of Mississippi School of Law.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. Since the inception of the Act it has generated a great deal of commentary both favorable, see, e.g., Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U.
L. REV. 667 (1976); Misner, Delay, Documentation and the Speedy Trial
Act, 70 J. CRnv. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 214 (1979), and unfavorable, see, e.g.,
Black, The Speedy Trial Act-Justice on the Assembly Line, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 225 (1976); Kozinski, That Can of Worms: The Speedy Trial Act, 62
A.B.A.J. 862 (1976).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. See generally Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in Constitutional Perspective, 47 Miss. L.J. 365 (1976); Note, Better Never than Late:
Pre-Arrest Delay as a Violation of Due Process, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1041.
CHI.

5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 is the principal authority for pretrial discovery,
and it is silent with regard to witnesses' names. See infra notes 124-128 and
accompanying text.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. The legislative history of the Act indicates that many of the burdens placed on defendants were not inadvertent. Although the Act was
at least partially intended to clarify the speedy trial rights of defendants, its sponsors' major concern was to protect society from crimes
committed by defendants who are released pending trial.
Project, The Speedy TrialAct: An EmpiricalStudy, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 713,
739 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FordhamStudy]. "Defense counsel are beginning to learn that 'it is obvious that the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was not
written with the rights of the defendant is mind.'" Misner, supra note 2, at
226, quoting United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1977). "The
interests of the public in a speedy criminal sanction . .. would have pri-
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even refer to protection of the defendant. The preamble sets
forth the Act's purpose of "assist [ing] in reducing crime and the
danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial, and
for other purposes." The first paragraph of Partridge's legislative history summarizes the changing purposes of speedy trial
legislation:
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was a product of the national concern with increasing crime in the late 1960's. Many states had
adopted speedy trial legislation before the late sixties, and speedy
trial bills had been introduced in Congress from time to time. The
state legislation and the early congressional bills, however, had
been concerned with clarifying the rights of defendants. In the late
sixties, speedy trial legislation acquired a second purpose: it was
seen as a vehicle for protecting
society's interest in bringing
9
criminals to justice promptly.
The Barker Decision
Prior to the enactment of speedy trial statutes, questions of
timely prosecution were resolved under case law interpreting
the sixth amendment, especially Barker v. Wingo. 10 In Barker,
the Supreme Court established a four-part test for determining
whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial had
been violated. 1 The four factors to be considered are the length
of delay, the reason for the delay, assertion by the defendant of
his speedy trial right, and prejudice to the accused.' 2 Barker
also recognized that society has an interest in speedy adjudication of criminal cases because "[i n addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and
fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy
trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to,
13
the interests of the accused."'
macy in this legislation. It will help some accused persons, but by and large
it will help the system achieve the goal of speedy application of the criminal
law." Speedy Trial: Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
141 (1971) (statement of Prof. Freed). See also Bridges, The Speedy Trial
Act of 1974. Effects on Delays in FederalCriminalLitigation, 73 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 50, 50-51 (1982).

8. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
9. A.

PARTRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

1974 11 (1980).
10. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
11. Id. at 530. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.

12. Id.
.13. Id. at 519. Accord Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86 (1905); United States v.
Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir. 1976).
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The Barker test is quite flexible and is, therefore, not quantifiable within specific time frames. Instead, with the Barker
test, the length of constitutionally permissible delay varies according to the facts and circumstances of each case. Dissatisfaction with Barker prompted efforts, led by the American Bar
Association, to establish fixed standards for measuring and requiring speedy trials in criminal cases. 14 The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, in its report on the
Speedy Trial Act, expressed criticism of Barker. Barker provided no guidance, the committee said, to the defendant or the
criminal justice system.' 5 Instead, the Barker test "reinforce [d]
the legitimacy of delay." 16 The committee also criticized the
Barker test for permitting courts to find a one-year delay prima
facie evidence of a denial of the speedy trial right in some cases
and to sanction delays up to 18 years in other cases.17 Because
of this perceived inadequacy of the Barker test, Congress
adopted speedy trial legislation in an effort to protect the public's right in reducing crime and recidivism by a speedy resolution of criminal cases. 18
Legislative History of the Speedy Trial Act
In June 1971, Senator Sam Ervin introduced the Speedy
Trial Act. At this time, the Nixon administration was promoting
legislation to permit "preventive detention" of defendants on
pretrial release.19 Senator Ervin offered his bill as an alternative to preventive detention. 20 The pressure for preventive detention legislation eventually dissipated, but Ervin's bill
continued to be considered until it was finally adopted in 1974.
14. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 717. The American Bar Association

was the first to establish recommended standards with the promulgation of
Standards Relating to Speedy Trial in 1968. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 269-79 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

ABA Standards].
15. H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 713; THE PROCESSING

OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 (AS AMENDED 1979):
LEVELS AND PATTERNS OF COMPLIANCE PRIOR TO THE IMPOSITION OF SANC-

IX, 1 (1980) (report by ABT Associates Inc. submitted to the Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as ABT REPORT]; Frase, supra note 2, at
669.
TIONS

19. The Speedy Trial Act had its beginnings in the so-called "Pre-Trial

Crime Reduction Act" introduced by Congressman Abner J. Mikva in 1969.
Congressman Mikva introduced his bill as an alternative to the "repugnant,
and probably unconstitutional" preventive detention advocated by the administration. A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 9, at 12-13.

20. Id. at 13-14.
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The Act's legislative history contains occasional references to
the defendant's speedy trial rights, but more often the legislative history reflects a congressional intent to vindicate society's
right to the prompt adjudication of criminal cases and the prevention of crime by criminals on pretrial release. 21 The preamble to the Act refers to unnamed "other purposes," but the only
expressly stated purpose in the preamble is reducing crime and
recidivism.
The emphasis on crime reduction can be understood in the
context of the late sixties and early seventies, an era of political
demonstrations in which the Nixon administration took a hard
line on crime generally, as well as on demonstrators. 2 2 However, evidence of crime related to pretrial release was meager,
as indicated by the House Report:
The National Bureau of Standards study provides the only statistical data on rearrests of defendants awaiting trial. In a study of 712
defendants during four weeks in 1968, the study found that of the
426 defendants on pretrial release, 47 were rearrested and formally
charged with crimes committed while on release. This amounts to
an 11 percent recidivism, or rearrest, rate. But, most importantly,
the study's recidivist index shows:
(a) An increased propensity to be re-arrested when released
more than 280 days;
(b) an increased propensity of persons classified as dangerous
under the proposed legislation to be re-arrested in the period
from 24 to 8 weeks prior to trial; and

(c) a somewhat greater propensity to be re-arrested while

awaiting sentence or appeal after trial when on pre-trial
release.23

The Report acknowledged that the subcommittee could not
rely on this study as an indication of recidivism rates for federal
defendants, but the subcommittee apparently relied on the
24
study anyway because there was no other evidence presented.
Even in this small study, 89 percent of released defendants were
not rearrested. In the other 11 percent of the cases, rearrests
apparently occurred more frequently when trial was delayed

more than nine months, when the defendant was classified as
dangerous, or when the defendant was released after trial. Obviously, the only available statistics did not support the conclu21. Id. at 14-15. Partridge recognizes that not all statements of legislative purpose were "balanced," but expressions of both the defendant's and
society's rights are found throughout the legislative materials. Id. at 14. On
the other hand, Misner asserts that in adopting the Act, Congress was
"[p Irompted by a desire to reduce criminal activity, and by a wish to erect a
fitting memorial to retiring Senator Sam Ervin." Misner, supra note 2, at
214.
22. See A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 9.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1974).
24. Id. at 16.
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sion that there was a high incident of crime committed by all
types of defendants released before trial, or that a drastically
brief time from arrest to trial was an appropriate remedy for the
pretrial crime that did occur. Yet the preamble to the Act states
that the Act's purpose was to reduce crime and recividism.
It can be argued that the crime reduction language of the
preamble relates to crime generally and not just to crime committed by defendants on pretrial release. This interpretation of
the preamble is supported by the House Report's reference to
increasing crime rates and its conclusion that "faster and efficient criminal processing would increase the deterrent effect of
the criminal law, ease the task of rehabilitation of offenders and
'25
reduce crime.
Whatever prompted the belief that society needed more expeditious handling of criminal cases, it is apparent that Congress did not trust lawyers and judges to effect this change.
Senator Ervin himself made it clear that distrust of the participants in the criminal process was at least part of the impetus for
speedy trial legislation, stating that:
[t]here is no question in my mind that speedy trial will never be a
reality until Congress makes it clear that it will no longer tolerate
delay. Unfortunately, while it is in the public interest to have
speedy trials, the parties involved in the criminal process do not
feel any pressure to go to trial. The court, defendant, his attorney
and the prosecutor may have different reasons not to push for trial,
but they all have some reason. The over-worked courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys depend on delay in order to cope with
their heavy caseloads. The end of one trial only means the start of
another. To them, there is little incentive to move quickly in what
they see as an unending series of cases. The defendant, of course,
is in no hurry for trial because
he wishes to delay his day of reckon26
ing as long as possible.
Senator Ervin's remarks support the thesis that the Speedy
Trial Act was not designed for the protection of the defendant
25. H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
26. Hearings on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658, H.R. 687, H.R. 773,
and H.R. 4807 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1974). The legislative materials considered by the House and Senate in connection with amendments proposed in
1979 include articles displaying distrust of, perhaps even contempt for, the
lawyers and judges involved in the criminal process. See Misner, supra
note 2, at 214-15, 219-26; FordhamStudy, supra note 7, at 752-53. The former
article is reproduced as an appendix to ProposedAmendments to the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 419 (1980); the latter article is
reproduced as an appendix to The Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1979."
Hearings on S. 961 and S. 1028 Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 643 (1979).
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but to further society's interest in speedy prosecutions in order
27
to prevent crime.
PROVISIONS OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Rush to Trial after Arrest or Indictment
Under the Speedy Trial Act, as amended in 1979,28 cases
must be processed rapidly. The government ordinarily must in29
dict an arrested defendant within 30 days following the arrest.
If a not guilty plea is entered, the trial must occur within 70 days
following the date of the indictment or the date of the defendant's first appearance, whichever occurs last.30 The Act contains
provisions for excluding delays from these time frames, 3 1 and
the period within which the defendant must be indicted or tried
can be extended by the number of days excludable under these
provisions. 32 The exclusions, however, are applicable only when
special circumstances are present since the Act is a clear statement by Congress that in ordinary circumstances the indictment should occur within 30 days after arrest and the trial
33
should be held within 70 days following the indictment.
The time available to a particular defendant depends upon
whether his arrest occurs before or after the indictment. 34 If
there is a pre-indictment arrest, the two time periods provide
the defendant no more than 100 days 35 to secure counsel and
27. If indeed crime and recidivism rates can be correlated with the
length of prosecutions, the Act has not achieved its goal of crime prevention
because "the courts have achieved only slight improvements in the actual
time elapsed in processing cases." Bridges, supra note 7, at 53.
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 &Supp. IV 1980).
29. Id. at § 3161(b).
30. Id. at § 3161(c) (Supp. IV 1980). The Act originally provided for
three intervals: 30 days from arrest to indictment, 10 days from indictment
to arraignment, and 60 days from arraignment to trial. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b)

and

(c) (Supp. 1978).

31. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
32. For example, excludable periods of delay include the time when the
defendant or an essential witness is unavailable, id. at § 3161(h) (3); up to 30

days while the court has a pretrial motion under advisement, id. at
§ 3161(h) (1) (G); and periods of continuances granted because the "ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial," id. at § 3161(h) (8).
33. Cf. SECOND CIRCUIT GUIDELINES UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT,
§ III.B, comment 4 (1978).
34. Under § 3161(b), an arrest expressly triggers the running of the 30day arrest to indictment period; under § 3161(c), an indictment or first appearance expressly triggers the 70-day indictment to trial period; however,
the period before the arrest is not subject to the Act at all. United States v.
laquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264, 269 (4th Cir. 1982).
35. The initial appearance following the arrest but before indictment is
the first appearance for § 3161(c) purposes, and the 70-day indictment to
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prepare for trial. If there is no pre-indictment arrest, the defendant has no more than 70 days to find a lawyer and get ready
for trial. The accused is afforded some protection from the
prejudice due to short preparation time by the 1979 amendments' prohibition against commencing trial sooner than 30 days
'36
following the defendant's first appearance "through counsel.
Congress attempted to strengthen the Act by requiring dismissal of charges if the 30- or 70-day time limit is not met.37 Dismissal can be with or without prejudice, as determined by the
court after considering factors set forth in the Act. 38 However,
39
since the dismissal sanction became effective in July 1980, it
has been of no practical value to defendants. The Speedy Trial
Act has not significantly reduced the time actually required for
processing criminal cases throughout the federal system. 40 Statistics indicate that dismissal sanctions are being imposed fewer
than 20 times in over 30,000 cases. 4 ' Therefore it appears that
neither the societal interest in, nor the accused's right to, a
speedy trial is being vindicated by the Act. Yet "the preponderance of defendants are limited to a maximum preparation time
of seventy days '42 because most of them are not arrested before
the date of their indictment.4 3 This rush to trial in the average
case is the most negative aspect of the Speedy Trial Act.
trial period is therefore triggered not by the first appearance but by the

filing of the indictment. United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 384 (3d
Cir. 1982).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
37. Id. at § 3162(a).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
39. Id. at § 3163(c).
40. See supra note 27.
41. In the 10 months ending June 30, 1981, the federal courts disposed of
30,500 cases; in only 19 of those cases was the dismissal sanction used. Of
those 19 cases, only nine were dismissed with prejudice. Five cases were
dismissed without prejudice, and the records do not reflect whether the

remaining five dismissals were with or without prejudice. Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,
1981, ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974
107 (1981).
42. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 740. Unfortunately, the full 70 days
will seldom be available because all defendants indicted by one grand jury
cannot normally be brought to trial on the last day of the period. See United
States Department of Justice, DELAYS IN THE PROCESSING OF CRIMINAL
CASES UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

1974 32 n.40 (1979) [hereinafter

cited as Justice Dept. Study].
43. It appears that just over one-third of all cases are commenced by
arrest prior to indictment. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, SIXTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT OF

1974 12 (1980).
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Minimal Restrictions on the Prosecutor'sPretrial
PreparationTime
Perhaps the heaviest burdens of the Act have fallen upon defendants and defense counsel. Defense attorneys argue that the
Act provides insufficient time to prepare an effective defense, especially when indictment precedes arrest. In that situation, the defense has only minimal time to prepare for trial. The prosecutor, on
the other hand, can prepare his case extensively before
indictment.4
In those cases in which there is a pre-indictment arrest by
federal authorities, the government and the defendant are subject to the same time constraints following the arrest only if the
offense and the arrest occur more or less contemporaneously.
Both sides are confronted with limited time for preparation in
such cases because indictment must follow arrest by no more
than 30 days and the trial must occur within 70 days following
indictment. 45 Thus both sides must be ready for trial within a
few weeks following the date of the alleged crime. If, however,
the date of the alleged offense is some time before the arrest, or
if there is no pre-indictment arrest, government counsel has a
substantial advantage over defense counsel in terms of investigation and preparation time because the Speedy Trial Act does
not apply to the time between the offense and the arrest or indictment.46 Furthermore, only federal arrests trigger the Act's
time limits, i.e., the defendant must be in federal custody. The
Act is not triggered by state custody even if federal law enforcement officers have participated in the investigation or in the ar47
rest itself.
Since the Act does not apply to the time between the offense
and a subsequent arrest, any prejudice to the defendant from
delay between the date of the offense and the institution of proceedings by arrest or indictment must be measured against the
fifth and sixth amendments. Unfortunately, neither amendment
provides the defendant with protection." The same events, arrest or indictment, trigger the protection of both the Speedy
44. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 715 (emphasis added). Unlike

state speedy trial legislation, Professor Black says, the federal Act requires
a speedy trial whether the defendant wants one or not and is unique in
turning the time limitations against the defendant. Black, supra note 2, at
225-27.
45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b), 3161(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
46. United States v. laquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982). See also

United States v. Lai Ming Tanu, 589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978).
47. United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Lai Ming Tanu, 589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978).
48. Dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's sixth amendment decision
in Barker was at least in part what led to the adoption of the Act. See supra
notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
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49
Trial Act and the speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment.
Ordinarily, therefore, neither the Speedy Trial Act, nor the constitutional right to a speedy trial, will provide any remedy for
delay from the date of the offense to the date of arrest or indictment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently held that
"[tihe Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is .. .not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by
passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due
50
Process Clause and by statutes of limitations.

The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides the
defendant only marginally better protection against pre-arrest
delay than the sixth amendment. The due process constraints
against pre-accusation 5 ' delay were first obliquely articulated in
United States v. Marion,52 which concluded that the "Due Process Clause ... would require dismissal of the indictment if it
Were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case
caused substantial prejudice to appellee's rights to a fair trial
and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. . . -53 The Court in Marion did not
say that both prejudice to the accused and intentional tactical
delay by the prosecutor would be necessary before the due process clause would require dismissal--only that if both were
present, dismissal would be mandated. The Court added only
slight clarification in United States v. Lovasco,54 in which it held
that although prejudice to the defendant must be shown, this by
itself is not enough; the reason for the delay must also be
55
shown.
The circuit courts have not always been consistent in their
interpretation of the due process protection against pre-accusa49. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). Apparently it takes a federal arrest to invoke
sixth amendment speedy trial rights in federal prosecutions. "Of course, an
arrest or indictment by one sovereign would not cause the speedy trial
guarantees to become engaged as to possible subsequent indictments by
another sovereign." United States v. MacDonald, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 1497,
1503 n.11 (1982). But see Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.
1975), reh'g denied, 526 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1976).

50. United States v. MacDonald, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502 (1982).
51. In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 320 (1971), the Supreme

Court held the speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment to be inapplicable until the defendant is accused by indictment, information or arrest. The
term "pre-accusation" in the context of this article refers to the period of
time prior to the engagement of the constitutional speedy trial right.
52. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
53. Id. at 324.
54. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
55. Id. at 790.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:27

tion delay.5 6 However, it appears that the courts usually require
a showing of actual prejudice and either intentional 57 or negligent 58 conduct by the prosecutor. This is such a difficult standard of proof that a defendant will seldom be able to establish a
right to dismissal under the fifth amendment for wrongful and
5 9
prejudicial delay prior to arrest or indictment.
Although the due process clause does provide some minimal protection from pre-accusation delay, the Speedy Trial Act
does not afford the accused any protection from pre-accusation
delay. In United States v. laquinta,60 the court stated that the
Act
[s] ets ... certain very definite, mechanical-like rules within which
one must be indicted after an arrestbut those rules have nothing to
do with what the United States Attorney does pre-arrest. It certainly does not attempt to change the settled principle that, apart
from the constraints of the applicable statute of limitations, the

time for the commencement of a prosecution-much like the decision whether to prosecute
at all-generally lies entirely within the
61
prosecutor's discretion.

Also, a prosecutor is not obligated to indict as soon as there is
62
enough evidence to prosecute.
The time limitations of the Act and the prosecutor's virtually unlimited discretion in determining when to file charges has
led to a tactical change in the timing of some arrests. During
hearings on the 1979 amendments to the Act, Assistant Attorney
General Heymann reported that during the year ending June 30,
1978, the number of cases commenced by arrest had decreased
from 18,849 to 9,169. He indicated that this decrease was due to a
change in arrest policies implemented to avoid violating the
Speedy Trial Act. 63 Studies of practices under the Act support
56. Note, Better Never than Late: Pre-ArrestDelay as a Violation of Due
Process, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1041, 1045.

57. United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 794 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 382 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Elsbery,
602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979); United States v.
Ramos, 586 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978).
58. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 1977).
59. The courts are more likely to find a constitutional violation for postaccusation delay than for pre-accusation delay. Arnold v. McCarthy, 566
F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978). The most common effect from pre-accusation
delay is faded memories, neither easily established nor readily accepted as
prejudice by the courts. United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 302-05 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978).
60. 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982).
61. Id. at 269.
62. 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982).
63. S. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1979). One effect of the
reduction in arrest is that persons who should have been confined were at
large. Id. Accord Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 23.
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Heymann's assertion. 64 A Justice Department report succinctly
stated the reasons for the reduction in the rate of pre-indictment
arrests as follows:
As reported by several planning groups, and confirmed by United
States Attorneys, many United States Attorneys have instructed
law enforcement agencies in their districts to avoid making arrests
before indictment whenever possible, notwithstanding the existence of clear, or even abundant, probable cause. The reason is obvious: whereas an arrest "starts the clock," an investigation not
interrupted by an arrest may continue without limitation until completed. Apparently, the practice of deferring arrests is not
uncommon.P5,

Thus, in cases in which there is no federal arrest prior to
indictment, it is possible for the government to pursue its investigation without any real time restrictions. Before the Speedy
Trial Act's rush to judgment begins, the prosecution is able fully
to prepare its case, delaying indictment until it is ready for trial
and thereby gaining a tremendous advantage over defense counsel who, prior to the indictment, has probably never heard of the
66
case or met the defendant.
NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

Disparate Voices United in Criticism
Practice under the Speedy Trial Act has spawned a vast
amount of criticism from diverse and, at times, antagonistic
sources. 67 Defense attorneys have voiced complaints of insufficient time to prepare an adequate defense.6 8 The United States
Department of Justice, ordinarily not an advocate for defend64. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 740-42; ABT REPORT, supra note 18,
at 79-89; Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 22-23. But see SPEEDY TRIAL
AcT-ITs IMPACT ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM STILL UNKNOWN 42-43 (1979) (although all eight United States Attorneys questioned reported that they
avoid arrest prior to indictment, only one blamed this practice on the Act)
[hereinafter cited as GAO Report].
65. Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 22-23.
66. ABT REPORT, supra note 18, at 89, suggests that the practice of delaying indictment in order to prepare the prosecution's case "may give the
prosecutor an unfair advantage during the indictment-to-trial interval.
While the prosecutor may have virtually unlimited time in preparing the
case, constrained only by the statute of limitations, the defense counsel has
only 70 net days." Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 742 n.180, found that
nine of the 15 prosecutors interviewed reported that they were fully prepared for trial at the time of the indictment. Such "[e] xtensive pre-indictment preparation by the Government can place defendants who become
aware of the charges against them only after indictment at a serious strategic disadvantage." Id. at 742-43.
67. See, e.g., Berreby, Courts Play Beat the Clock, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26,
1981, at 1, col. 1; see generally supra note 2 and infra notes 72-92.
68. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 743. Fourteen of the 15 experienced
attorneys interviewed voiced this opinion. Ten of 16 total attorneys de-
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ants or defense counsel, has noted that defense counsel normally has only one to three weeks to meet the client, familiarize
himself with the case, negotiate discovery disclosure, research
the law, and prepare his motions. 69 The Act has been unpopular, too, with that impartial trier of fact, the federal court system.70 Repeal of the Act and return to the use of Federal Rule 50
has been recommended by several district courts. 71 The Act has
also been declared unconstitutional in some districts because it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers.7 2 The American
Bar Association, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
and the United States Justice Department all have recommended that Congress expand the arbitrarily set time period between arraignment and trial to afford defense counsel sufficient
time to schedule, prepare for, and commence trials.73 The academic community, too, has criticized the arraignment-to-trial
time limit because it "fail [s] to address the crucial issue of the
amount of time needed to dispose of criminal cases.

'7 4

Most ob-

servers agree that the burden of the Act weighs most heavily on
the defendant7 5 who is restricted to 70 days net despite the
probability that the prosecutor has prepared extensively prior to
indictment.
clared that they had gone to trial unprepared because of "tighter scheduling" due to the Act. Id.
69. Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 32. The short time frame for
filing motions is not expressly mandated by the Act, but is commonly employed to speed the processing of cases under the Act. See, e.g., PLAN FOR
PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL PLAN PURSUANT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT OF 1974 11 (1979) ("All pre-trial motions ... shall be filed no later
than ten days after arraignment."); ABT REPORT, supra note 18, at 64.

70. Thirteen district courts recommended that the Act be repealed. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, SIXTH REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE

I OF

THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

1974 52 (1980).

71. Id. Some district courts favor a return to the use of FED. R. CRIM. P.
50(b) to govern speedy trial issues.
72. Other criticism of the Act has emerged from case law. In United
States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd, 590 F.2d 564
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), the district court declared the Act
unconstitutional, saying that "its commands cannot be given effect because
they are an unconstitutional legislative encroachment on the judiciary." Id.
Justice Tom Clark, sitting with the Second Circuit, has written that "there
is a question under the doctrine of separation of powers that the Congress
can exercise judicial authority to the extent indulged here." United States
v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1976).
73. S. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979).
74. Frase, supra note 2, at 681. Accord Bridges, supra note 7, at 51.
Hearings on the 1979 amendments revealed a consensus that time limits
were too short if the exclusion provisions were strictly construed. A. PARTRIDGE, supra note 9, at 22.
75. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 715; Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, THIRD REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I AND
TITLE II OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 13 (1978); Bridges, supra note 7, at
51; Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 31-32.
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Nature of Complaints
Federal defenders' most common complaint regarding the
Act is the insufficient time they have in which to develop a rapport with the defendant. Because defendants often regard their
court-appointed counsel as employees of the establishment,
they may withhold information due to a lack of trust.76 As a result, the attorney may be unable to thoroughly evaluate the
case, foregoing the recommendation of a guilty plea when one
would be desirable. 77 Furthermore, a defendant who does not
trust his counsel may reject his advice. 78 Lack of rapport may
thus result in needless and protracted litigation.
Often defendants for whom federal defenders have been appointed later manage to retain private counsel after raising the
necessary funds. 79 Such privately-retained counsel encounter
special problems. 80 Private practitioners do not often have the
staff to devote solely to the criminal case which is subject to the
rapidly dwindling 70-day time limitation. Unfortunately, the private practitioner "can't shut down his practice to concentrate on
one case."8 1 He may be forced to obtain continuances for other
cases in civil litigation, or to refund the defendant's fee so that
he or she can retain yet other counsel. Those attorneys subse76. Defense attorneys anticipate difficulty in gaining the confidence
of their client; considering alternatives to prosecution, such as pretrial

diversion; or working out a plea bargain because of the time frames.
Court-appointed defense attorneys say they often meet their clients for
the first time at the arraignment hearing and may not have sufficient
time to evaluate the charge or develop the case by trial date.
GAO Report, supra note 64, at 17.
77. Several prosecutors interviewed in the Fordham Study indicated
that the imbalance in preparation time induced more defendants to plead
guilty. Fordham Study, supra note 7, at 743 n.181.
78. See BINDER & PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
ENT CENTERED APPROACH 10-11 (1977).

A CLi-

79. During one recent period, 20,000 (or 47 percent) of the 43,500 defendants for whom counsel were appointed were represented by private attorneys not affiliated with federal defender organizations. Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 31
(1981).
80. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, SIXTH REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 41 (1980).

"Satisfactory financial arrangements between the defendant and his attorney often cannot be made in such short time-both as to attorney's fees and
fees for investigative work."

REPORT OF THE

AD

HOC COMMITTEE ON THE

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, app. A (July 18, 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE RUBIN REPORT].
81.

C. Anthony Friloux, President of the National Association of Crimi-

nal Defense Lawyers, Remarks at the 1979 Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, reprinted in 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2489 (Sept. 5,
1979).
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quently hired will face even tighter time frames because they
enter the case even later than at arraignment.
Generally, the federal defense bar in a given district is
small. 82 Scheduling conflicts inescapably arise since the most
competent defense lawyers may be representing several defendants at one time. 83 Contemporaneously ticking speedy trial
clocks compound the problem of providing an adequate defense
to each defendant. To alleviate the problem, some districts have
restricted the number of cases to which a lawyer can be assigned, and some attorneys have voluntarily reduced their criminal caseload in order to devote more attention to individual
cases. Others refuse to handle federal criminal cases at all.84 As
access to competent, experienced criminal defense lawyers
shrinks, some defendants necessarily must be assigned to or retain counsel who are less qualified than their more proficient
counterparts. Such unexperienced counsel require more time
to prepare an adequate defense, but regardless of expertise, all
attorneys are subject to the same 70-day rush to judgment. A
diminished quality of representation and thus a diminished
quality of justice can be the only result.
CongressionalResponse
Despite the overwhelming criticism from all quarters of the
legal community, Congress in 1979 was not persuaded that the
Speedy Trial Act adversely affects defendants,8 5 rationalizing
that the Act does provide for continuances in certain circumstances. Section 3161(h) (8) allows continuances to be excluded
from the 70-day period,86 but only upon the court's finding that

82. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, SIXTH REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974 41 (1980).
Accord THE RUBiN REPORT, supra note 80, at 5.
83. Misner, supra note 2, at 220 n.57.
84. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, SIXTH REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF
Accord THE RUBIN REPORT, supra note 80, at app. A.

1974 41 (1980).

The rigid and stringent time limitations of the Act preclude a lawyer
specializing in criminal work from representing more than a few clients
at one time. The time to prepare a case is too short from the defense
standpoint. As one lawyer summed up the situation, "the plain result is
that an act which was designed to be of aid and benefit to defendants
defeats its purpose."
Id.

85. S. REP, No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 805.

86. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 3161(h) provides for the exclusion of other time periods. This article is concerned only
with those cases in which the net time from indictment to trial is felt to be
too short irrespective of other excludable time provisions. In 1981, 35,371
criminal cases were completed at the district court level. The excludable
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"the ends of justice served by granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a
87
speedy trial.
Section 3161(h) (8) (B) sets forth the factors that the court
shall consider in ruling upon a request for an "ends of justice"
continuance. The first is whether a denial of the request would
be likely either to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible or to result in a miscarriage of justice. 88 The court may
also grant a continuance if the case is so unusual or complex
that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself.8 9 A case may be "unusual
or complex" as a result of the number of defendants, the nature
of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or
law. 90 Thus, continuances will be granted under the foregoing
provisions only in cases in which the defendant can prove that
(1) the proceeding will probably terminate if no continuance is
allowed, (2) a miscarriage of justice will likely result without the
continuance, or (3) the case is unusual or complex and it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation. Obviously only an
extraordinary case will qualify for continuance for any of these
reasons.
"Liberal"Amendment Inadequate
An ostensibly more liberal section was added to the Act in
1979.91 Under section 3161(h) (8) (B) (iv), a continuance may be
granted even though the case is not unusual or complex, if denial of the request would (not "is likely to") (1) deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, (2) unreasonably
deny the government or the defendant continuity of counsel, or
(3) deny defense counsel or government counsel "the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. ' 92 Although this new
section appears to expand the number of cases in which contintime provisions were not applied in 21,420 of them (60.6 per cent). Adminis-

trative Office of the United States Courts, REPORT
JUNE 30, 1981, ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE I OF
OF 1974 121 (1981).

FOR THE YEAR ENDED
THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

87. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (A) (1976 &Supp. IV 1980). One can infer from
this language that if a continuance is granted there can be no speedy trial in

that case, since a prerequisite to the granting of the continuance is a finding
that the interest in a speedy trial is outweighed by the ends of justice.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (B) (i) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

89. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B) (ii) (1976 &Supp. IV 1980).
90. Id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (B) (iv) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

The Speedy

Trial Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43, § 5, 93 Stat. 327, 328 (1979).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (B) (iv) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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uances will be granted, 93 a defense attorney seeking more preparation time must show that (1) refusal of the requested
-continuance will deny him the reasonable time necessary for
preparation, (2) he has exercised due diligence, and (3) the
ends of justice outweigh both society's and the defendant's interest in a speedy trial. How are those factors to be measured?
In most cases, "[t] he extent to which the Act hampers a defendant in the preparation of his case

. . .

is probably not sus-

ceptible to objective verification. '94 It is the improbability of
establishing proof of prejudice from delay in the non-exceptional case that makes it virtually impossible to have a request
for a continuance sustained in those districts strictly construing
the Act. 95

Courts have varied in their interpretation of "ends of justice."'96 The effectiveness of section 3161(h) (8) is undermined
by strict construction in some courts and liberal construction in
others. 97 Some judges have interpreted the "ends of justice"
93. "More liberal use of the excludable time provisions, especially section 3161(h) (8), can effectively alleviate the difficulties encountered by defendants and their counsel under the permanent limits." Fordham Study,
supra note 7, at 746. This statement is even more appropriate after the 1979
amendments to 3161(h) (8) (B).
94. Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 33. "The prejudice from lack of
preparation and experience cannot be nicely weighed." United States v.
Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982).
95. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
96. It is not surprising that the courts are inconsistent. Congress in 1974
favored a conservative view of "ends of justice" provisions but became
somewhat more liberal by 1979. A PARTRIDGE, supra note 9, at 31. Nevertheless, the Senate Judiciary Committee declared that if "counsel for the defendant moves for an 'ends of justice' continuance under section 3161(h) (8)
to allow him or her additional time to prepare for trial, the court should
scrutinize closely his or her good-faith efforts to prepare for trial ...

"

Id.

at 75. Similarly, the committee stated:
Although some witnesses contended that all time consumed by motions
practice, from preparation through their disposition, should be excluded, the Committee finds that approach unreasonable. This is primarily because, in routine cases, preparation time should not be
excluded where the questions of law are not novel and the issues of fact
simple. However, the Committee would permit through its amendments to subsection (h) (8) (B) reasonable preparation time for pretrial
motions in cases presenting novel questions of law or complex facts.
We suggest caution by courts in granting "ends of justice" continuances
pursuant to this section, primarily because it will be quite difficult to
determine a point at which preparation actually begins.
S. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1979).
97. "With respect to the indictment-to-trial period, judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys alike expressed concern over continued judge variability in the use of exclusions." ABT REPORT, supra note 18, at XV. See S.
REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1979). The inconsistency of rulings
has spread to the circuit courts as well. Some appellate courts apply the
traditional rules for the granting of continuance, i.e., that the decision on a
request for a continuance rests entirely within the discretion of the trial
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provision as "a broad source of justification for delay" while
others have construed the section very strictly and will almost
never grant continuances. 98 ABT Associates concluded that
"narrow construction of the 'ends of justice' provision [is] the
major reason for continuing difficulties in securing continuity of
counsel and adequate time for effective case preparation." 99
Right to Waiver

If the defendant could waive the "right" to have the case
come to trial within 70 days, the burden of the time limitations
would be eased. Most state speedy trial statutes permit a waiver
of the time limits by the accused. 100 The Federal Speedy Trial
Act permits the defendant to waive only the 30-day minimum to
trial provision' 01 and the dismissal sanction. 10 2 Arguably, if the
defendant can waive the 70-day trial limit by failing to move for
dismissal after the delay, he should be able expressly to waive
the time limit before the delay occurs. Commentators, however,
10 3
generally agree that no such waiver is permitted by the Act.
judge whose decision will be reversed only upon a finding of abuse of discretion. United States v. Aviles, 623 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246, 1253 (8th Cir. 1978). Other courts reject the
"abuse of discretion" standard for section 3161(h) (8) motions and apply the
"clearly erroneous" test to any findings of fact and a "reversible if contrary
to law" test to any question of law. United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 862
(10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1981).
98. ABT REPORT, supra note 18, at 41. Accord Fordham Study, supra
note 7, at 747; Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 41; Bridges, supra note 7,
at 61. One judge felt that "the premium placed on speed might have an
unfortunate 'chilling effect' on motions for continuances. That is, some defense and Government attorneys may decline to seek continuances even
though they may be entitled to them and the continuance may be necessary
for effective case preparation." ABT REPORT, supra note 18, at 42.
99. ABT REPORT, supra note 18, at XV. In some districts, according to
federal defenders, continuances are easily obtained, but in others, they are
rarely granted. It is those districts in which the "ends of justice" provision
is strictly construed that defense counsel has the most difficulty in getting
prepared in the non-exceptional case. See also FordhamStudy, supra note
7, at 748-49, where it is suggested that the imbalance in preparation time be
considered in determining whether to grant or deny a section 3161(h) (8)
continuance.
100. Frase, supra note 2, at 698.
101. "Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, the trial
shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on which the
defendant first appears through counsel ....9" 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (2) (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
102. "Failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to the trial or
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the
right to dismissal under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (2) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980).
103. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 2, at 228-29; ABT REPORT, supra note 18,
at 96-97. Judge Thomas C. Platt of the Eastern District of New York has
argued, however, that refusing the accused the right to waive the provisions
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Guidelines of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts declare that a defendant's mere request or consent to a
continuance is not sufficient to toll the operation of the time limits. 10 4 The Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated unequivocally that "any construction which holds that any of the
provisions of the Speedy Trial Act is waivable by the defendant,
other than his statutorily-conferred right to move for dismissal
. . is contrary to legislative intent and subversive of its primary
objective .. ."105
A defendant seeking a delay for more preparation time may
be able to use extra-Act, traditional rules governing continuances. 10 6 In Avery v. Alabama,10 7 the Supreme Court recognized
that the denial of a requested continuance may be a sixth
amendment violation if defense counsel does not have sufficient
l0 8
opportunity to confer with the accused and prepare a defense.
The rule is well settled that "[tI he matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge."' 1 9 Convictions will be reversed for denial of a continuance only if one of a
defendant's fundamental rights has been violated." 0 Thus, extra-Act procedures provide no more likelihood of a continuance
than the "ends of justice" provisions of section 3161(h) (8).
*

of the Act may be a denial of due process. Platt, The Speedy Trial Act of
1974. A CriticalCommentary, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 757, 768-73 (1978).
104. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, GUIDELINES TO
1974 53 (amended 1979).
105. S. REP. No. 212, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1979). After reviewing the
legislative history, the Third Circuit stated: "We do not think a defendant
may waive the public's right to a speedy trial unless he complies with the
requirements carefully set forth in section 3161(h)." United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 390 (3d Cir. 1982). But see United States v.
deLongchamps, 679 F.2d 217 (11th Cir. 1982), in which the court did not address the question of whether waivers are permitted; rather it seemed to
assume a defendant can obtain a continuance by waiving a speedy trial. Id.
at 219.
106. See generally Comment, Assuring the Right to an Adequately PreTHE ADMINISTRATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF

pared Defense, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 302 (1974).

107. 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
108. Id. at 446-47.
109. Id. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).
110. Comment, Assuring the Right to an Adequately PreparedDefense, 65
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 302, 305 (1974). But see a recent line of cases in
the Tenth Circuit which offers a more liberal rule for the granting of
continuances:
Cases after Dyer Iv. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc) I have
established that when circumstances hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case, the defendant need not show specified errors
in the conduct of his defense in order to show ineffective assistance of
counsel. See U.S. v. King, 664 F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 1981); U.S. v.
Golub, 638 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1980). This is an eminently reasonable rule, for there is no way an appellate court can say precisely how a
given case would have been handled by a reasonably diligent and prop-
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Since the defendant cannot waive the Act's time limit and
continuances are not readily available in nonexceptional cases,
the defendant, willingly or unwillingly, must go to trial within 70
days. When the United States Attorney has taken months or
years to prepare the indictment, it is patently unrealistic to expect defense counsel to duplicate the prosecutor's effort in 70
days.'1 1 The short preparation period afforded defense counsel
in the nonexceptional case "is simply not enough time and must
inevitably result in a reduced standard of defense
preparation.""12
The Discovery Connection
Although nearly all states require that a list of witnesses be
made available to the accused, 113 federal discovery rules do not
require such disclosure. 114 Moreover, the Jencks Act" 5 precludes discovery of a government witness' statement until after
that witness has testified at the trial. 116 Nondiscoverability of
witnesses' names and addresses and the statements of prospective government witnesses often prevents a defense attorney
from having a proper understanding of the case and a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense." 7 In testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 1979 hearings, one
erly prepared lawyer. The prejudice from lack of preparation and experience cannot be nicely weighed ....
Under King and Golub, the circumstances to be considered in determining whether inadequacy of representation may be inferred without proof of specific prejudice at trial include: "(1) the time afforded for
investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of counsel; (3) the
gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible defenses; and
(5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel."
United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 1982).
111. Seventy days is the maximum time that may be available. The time
may be as short as 30 days from appointment of counsel to trial, and even
shorter, perhaps only one week, from counsel's first contact with the case to
the pretrial motion deadline. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
112. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc SUBCOMMITrEE ON THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT TO
THE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

THE UNITED STATES 5 (1977).
113. Zagel & Carr, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557, app. A. at 622-28.
114. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); United States v. Rosales,
680 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1981). The basic discovery provision, FED. R. CRIM.

P. 16, is silent on the discoverability of witnesses' names. In capital cases,

witnesses' identities must be disclosed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1976 &

Supp. IV 1980).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976 &Supp. V 1980).
116. Id.
117. The Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1979." Hearingson S.961 and S.
1028 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96

(1979) (statement of John Cleary).
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speaker suggested that "[i In order to expedite the criminal process, there should be a free flow of all information made available to the defense save only in those cases where the
prosecution can affirmatively demonstrate some actual or reasonably expected threat to a witness." 118
The defendant may on occasion know absolutely nothing
about the charges and be of little help to defense counsel. Even
when he does have knowledge about the offense, he still may not
know the identity of the adverse witnesses. Furthermore, the
defendant may not recognize the legal significance of facts and
fail to disclose them, or may intentionally omit important information for psychological reasons. 119
Uncooperativeness of law enforcement agents who frequently refuse to talk to defense counsel also hampers investigations. Accordingly, even if the identity of these witnesses is
known, counsel is unlikely to learn from them anything that will
either assist in cross-examination or lead to the location of other
witnesses. If potential witnesses are out of state, their names
and identities are even less susceptible to discovery without
mandatory disclosure.
Defense counsel often confronts an adverse witness for the
first time in the courtroom after that witness has already become-acquainted with the prosecution. Impartial testimony is
118. The Speedy TrialAct Amendments of 1979: Hearingson S. 961 and S.
1028 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97
(1979) (statement of John Cleary). Cleary advocates substantial overhaul
of federal discovery laws, citing the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976 &
Supp. IV. 1980), as one of the "worst road blocks." 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97
(1979). Austere time limitations are an innovation of the Act. Disadvantages to defense counsel for indigents are not new, as has been recognized
by Justice William Brennan, long an advocate of liberal discovery rules:
Moreover, the court-appointed lawyer in a criminal case usually comes
to the case late, after the state has gathered its evidence against the
accused. Assigned counsel therefore must do what he can within the
limited time usually allowed him before trial, often long after the trail
has grown cold. He must deal with an accused whose obvious interest
in self-justification complicates his lawyer's task of finding the true
facts. Even if he can learn the names of the witnesses against his client, those witnesses have already talked to the state's investigators and
more frequently than not have been warned not to talk with anyone
representing the accused.
Brennan, The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event or Questfor Truth? 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 286. See generally Comment, A Proposed Rule of Criminal Pre-TrialDiscovery, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 443 (1978); Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963).
119. Psychological blocks to the free flow of information are a common
problem in attorney-client relationships, both civil and criminal. For example, a client may perceive facts as irrelevant, or he may perceive them as
threatening to his legal position. In both instances he may fail to disclose
the facts to his attorney. See generally BINDER & PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING,

A

CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH

(1977).

19821

Federal Speedy Trial Act

difficult to obtain on cross-examination under these circum-

stances. 1 20 Neither does the defense attorney have an opportunity before trial for reflection and formulation of a strategy for
the cross-examination of a witness whose very existence is
unknown.
Federal investigators commonly obtain written statements
from prospective witnesses. If a significant amount of time has
elapsed between the taking of the statement and the filing of
charges against the defendant, the witness' memory may have
faded by the time defense counsel talks to him. The witness
may even have forgotten about giving the statement. The prosecutor will, of course, have the witness read his statement before
taking the stand. Therefore, the story given by the witness to
defense counsel may vary significantly from his trial testimony
given after12 his memory was refreshed by a review of the
statement. '
One result of the Speedy Trial Act in some districts is that
fewer preliminary hearings are conducted. 122 This is especially
true where arrests have been intentionally delayed until after
indictment. The omission of the preliminary hearing eliminates
for the defendant to discover details of
a very good opportunity
123
case.
prosecutor's
the
These instances of prejudice attributable to inadequate discovery could be mitigated by mandatory disclosure of both the
names and addresses 24 of adverse witnesses and their statements. There is ample legal precedent for the discovery of the
identity of witnesses 25 and of their statements. 126 Moreover, in
1974, the Supreme Court recommended that Rule 16 be
amended to include witness disclosure, 12 7 but Congress rejected
the amendment. 28 Now that the Speedy Trial Act is fully effective with its attendant prejudice to the defendant from the com120. Weninger, CriminalDiscovery and Omnibus Procedurein a Federal
CAL. L. REv. 514, 548 (1976).
121. Faded memories alone will not ordinarily warrant dismissal; regardless of the length of delay, people will forget details. United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
122. Justice Dept. Study, supra note 42, at 23.
123. Id. See Weninger, supra note 120, at 529.
124. Disclosure of the names alone is inadequate; without the addresses
of witnesses who reside in metropolitan areas or in foreign states, the defendant may be unable to locate them.
125. United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304, 1305 (10th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973).
126. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870-71 (1966) (grand jury
testimony).
127. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R.
CRiM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) (April 22, 1974); H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
128. H.R. REP. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975).
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bined effects of extensive pre-indictment preparation by the
government and limited preparation time for defense counsel,
concealment of witnesses' identities and statements converts
the trial into an ambush. Today there is an even more critical
need for the proposed amendment to Rule 16 on disclosure than
there was in 1974.
CONCLUSION

The prosecutor often has substantially unlimited time for
thorough preparation before seeking an indictment. After the
indictment, the defense attorney in the nonexceptional case has,
at most, 70 days to prepare for trial under the Speedy Trial Act.
The brief preparation time in many cases is insufficient for reasons which may not be subject to objective proof, resulting in
prejudice to the defendant's case. The fully prepared prosecutor
may have surprise witnesses, whose identities are not discoverable, with which to ambush the defendant at trial. The fundamental unfairness of this situation is readily apparent.
Several interim measures which would help to alleviate the
problems created by the Act deserve consideration. First, trial
courts could more liberally grant requests for continuances
under section 3161(h) (8), providing defenders with sufficient
time to adequately prepare a defense. Granting continuances
need not be mandatory, but a more flexible approach is clearly
needed. Permitting the defendant to waive the 70-day indictment to trial time limitation offers another alternative. Lastly,
disclosure of the names of witnesses and their statements by
court order would facilitate the defendant's discovery procedures. Defense counsel could thus use discovery time more efficiently without impeding the swift administration of justice.
Congress, too, has a responsibility for implementing
changes in the Act which would restore fairness to the criminal
proceeding. It could amend the Speedy Trial Act, extending the
70-day indictment to trial period to a more reasonable length,
depending on the nature of the crime charged. Amending Rule
16 to permit the discovery of the names and addresses of persons having knowledge of the offense or who are likely to testify
at trial, along with their statements, would also lessen some of
the hardship encountered by the defense in meeting the strict
time limitation.

